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CVE-2021-22942 Moderate

CVE-2021-22942

A possible open redirect vulnerability in the Host Authorization middleware in Action Pack >= 6.0.0 that could allow attackers to redirect users to a malicious website.

Exploit probability 1.7%
Published October 18, 2021
Required by Not available
Last source change August 7, 2026

02 / AFFECTED SOFTWARE

Affected packages

Unknown Unknown

7 explicit affected versions

RubyGems actionpack

26 explicit affected versions

03 / CONNECTIONS

Connected vulnerabilities

04 / EVIDENCE

Source records

Open Source Vulnerabilities CVE-2021-22942

A possible open redirect vulnerability in the Host Authorization middleware in Action Pack >= 6.0.0 that could allow attackers to redirect users to a malicious website.

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Open Source Vulnerabilities GHSA-2rqw-v265-jf8c

# Overview There is a possible open redirect vulnerability in the Host Authorization middleware in Action Pack. This vulnerability has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2021-22942. Versions Affected: >= 6.0.0. Not affected: < 6.0.0 Fixed Versions: 6.1.4.1, 6.0.4.1 # Impact Specially crafted “X-Forwarded-Host” headers in combination with certain “allowed host” formats can cause the Host Authorization middleware in Action Pack to redirect users to a malicious website. Impacted applications will have allowed hosts with a leading dot. For example, configuration files that look like this: ```ruby config.hosts << '.EXAMPLE.com' ``` When an allowed host contains a leading dot, a specially crafted Host header can be used to redirect to a malicious website. This vulnerability is similar to CVE-2021-22881, but CVE-2021-22881 did not take in to account domain name case sensitivity. # Releases The fixed releases are available at the normal locations. # Workarounds In the case a patch can’t be applied, the following monkey patch can be used in an initializer: ```ruby module ActionDispatch class HostAuthorization HOSTNAME = /[a-z0-9.-]+|\[[a-f0-9]*:[a-f0-9.:]+\]/i VALID_ORIGIN_HOST = /\A(#{HOSTNAME})(?::\d+)?\z/ VALID_FORWARDED_HOST = /(?:\A|,[ ]?)(#{HOSTNAME})(?::\d+)?\z/ private def authorized?(request) origin_host = request.get_header("HTTP_HOST")&.slice(VALID_ORIGIN_HOST, 1) || "" forwarded_host = request.x_forwarded_host&.slice(VALID_FORWARDED_HOST, 1) || "" @permissions.allows?(origin_host) && (forwarded_host.blank? || @permissions.allows?(forwarded_host)) end end end ```

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05 / REFERENCES

Further evidence