Memory exhaustion in QUIC connection handling in crypto/tls
QUIC connections do not set an upper bound on the amount of data buffered when reading post-handshake messages, allowing a malicious QUIC connection to cause unbounded memory growth. With fix, connections now consistently reject messages larger than 65KiB in size.
02 / AFFECTED SOFTWARE
Affected packages
1 explicit affected versions
03 / CONNECTIONS
Connected vulnerabilities
04 / EVIDENCE
Source records
QUIC connections do not set an upper bound on the amount of data buffered when reading post-handshake messages, allowing a malicious QUIC connection to cause unbounded memory growth. With fix, connections now consistently reject messages larger than 65KiB in size.
QUIC connections do not set an upper bound on the amount of data buffered when reading post-handshake messages, allowing a malicious QUIC connection to cause unbounded memory growth. With fix, connections now consistently reject messages larger than 65KiB in size.
QUIC connections do not set an upper bound on the amount of data buffered when reading post-handshake messages, allowing a malicious QUIC connection to cause unbounded memory growth. With fix, connections now consistently reject messages larger than 65KiB in size.
05 / REFERENCES
Further evidence
- https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2023/39xxx/CVE-2023-39322.json
- https://go.dev/cl/523039
- https://go.dev/issue/62266
- https://groups.google.com/g/golang-dev/c/2C5vbR-UNkI/m/L1hdrPhfBAAJ
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-39322
- https://pkg.go.dev
- https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2023-2045
- https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202311-09
- https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20231020-0004/