QUIC's Connection ID Mechanism vulnerable to Memory Exhaustion Attack
quic-go is an implementation of the QUIC protocol in Go. Prior to version 0.42.0, an attacker can cause its peer to run out of memory sending a large number of `NEW_CONNECTION_ID` frames that retire old connection IDs. The receiver is supposed to respond to each retirement frame with a `RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID` frame. The attacker can prevent the receiver from sending out (the vast majority of) these `RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID` frames by collapsing the peers congestion window (by selectively acknowledging received packets) and by manipulating the peer's RTT estimate. Version 0.42.0 contains a patch for the issue. No known workarounds are available.
02 / AFFECTED SOFTWARE
Affected packages
32 explicit affected versions
03 / CONNECTIONS
Connected vulnerabilities
04 / EVIDENCE
Source records
An attacker can cause its peer to run out of memory by sending a large number of NEW_CONNECTION_ID frames that retire old connection IDs. The receiver is supposed to respond to each retirement frame with a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame. The attacker can prevent the receiver from sending out (the vast majority of) these RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames by collapsing the peers congestion window (by selectively acknowledging received packets) and by manipulating the peer's RTT estimate. I published a more detailed description of the attack and its mitigation in this blog post: https://seemann.io/posts/2024-03-19-exploiting-quics-connection-id-management/. I also presented this attack in the IETF QUIC working group session at IETF 119: https://youtu.be/JqXtYcZAtIA?si=nJ31QKLBSTRXY35U&t=3683 There's no way to mitigate this attack, please update quic-go to a version that contains the fix.
An attacker can cause its peer to run out of memory by sending a large number of NEW_CONNECTION_ID frames that retire old connection IDs. The receiver is supposed to respond to each retirement frame with a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame. The attacker can prevent the receiver from sending out (the vast majority of) these RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames by collapsing the peers congestion window (by selectively acknowledging received packets) and by manipulating the peer's RTT estimate.
quic-go is an implementation of the QUIC protocol in Go. Prior to version 0.42.0, an attacker can cause its peer to run out of memory sending a large number of `NEW_CONNECTION_ID` frames that retire old connection IDs. The receiver is supposed to respond to each retirement frame with a `RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID` frame. The attacker can prevent the receiver from sending out (the vast majority of) these `RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID` frames by collapsing the peers congestion window (by selectively acknowledging received packets) and by manipulating the peer's RTT estimate. Version 0.42.0 contains a patch for the issue. No known workarounds are available.
05 / REFERENCES
Further evidence
- https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go
- https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/commit/4a99b816ae3ab03ae5449d15aac45147c85ed47a
- https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/security/advisories/GHSA-c33x-xqrf-c478
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-22189
- https://seemann.io/posts/2024-03-19-exploiting-quics-connection-id-management
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JqXtYcZAtIA&t=3683s
- https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2024/22xxx/CVE-2024-22189.json