Karmada PULL Mode Cluster Privilege Escalation in github.com/karmada-io/karmada

Open Source Vulnerabilities GO-2025-3364

Karmada PULL Mode Cluster Privilege Escalation in github.com/karmada-io/karmada

Open Source Vulnerabilities GHSA-mg7w-c9x2-xh7r

### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ The [PULL](https://karmada.io/docs/next/userguide/clustermanager/cluster-registration#pull-mode) mode clusters registered with the `karmadactl register` command have excessive privileges to access control plane resources. By abusing these permissions, an attacker able to authenticate as the karmada-agent to a karmada cluster would be able to obtain administrative privileges over the entire federation system including all registered member clusters. ### Patches _Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_ Since Karmada v1.12.0, command `karmadactl register` restricts the access permissions of pull mode member clusters to control plane resources. This way, an attacker able to authenticate as the karmada-agent cannot control other member clusters in Karmada. ### Workarounds _Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_ Restricts the access permissions of pull mode member clusters to control plane resources according to [Karmada Component Permissions Docs](https://karmada.io/docs/administrator/security/component-permission). ### References _Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_ 1. Enhancements made from the Karmada community: https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada/pull/5793 2. Karmada Component Permissions: https://karmada.io/docs/administrator/security/component-permission

Open Source Vulnerabilities CVE-2024-56513

Karmada is a Kubernetes management system that allows users to run cloud-native applications across multiple Kubernetes clusters and clouds. Prior to version 1.12.0, the PULL mode clusters registered with the `karmadactl register` command have excessive privileges to access control plane resources. By abusing these permissions, an attacker able to authenticate as the karmada-agent to a karmada cluster would be able to obtain administrative privileges over the entire federation system including all registered member clusters. Since Karmada v1.12.0, command `karmadactl register` restricts the access permissions of pull mode member clusters to control plane resources. This way, an attacker able to authenticate as the karmada-agent cannot control other member clusters in Karmada. As a workaround, one may restrict the access permissions of pull mode member clusters to control plane resources according to Karmada Component Permissions Docs.