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CVE-2025-38679 Not scored

media: venus: Fix OOB read due to missing payload bound check

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: venus: Fix OOB read due to missing payload bound check Currently, The event_seq_changed() handler processes a variable number of properties sent by the firmware. The number of properties is indicated by the firmware and used to iterate over the payload. However, the payload size is not being validated against the actual message length. This can lead to out-of-bounds memory access if the firmware provides a property count that exceeds the data available in the payload. Such a condition can result in kernel crashes or potential information leaks if memory beyond the buffer is accessed. Fix this by properly validating the remaining size of the payload before each property access and updating bounds accordingly as properties are parsed. This ensures that property parsing is safely bounded within the received message buffer and protects against malformed or malicious firmware behavior.

Exploit probability 0.1%
Published September 4, 2025
Required by Not available
Last source change July 15, 2026

02 / AFFECTED SOFTWARE

Affected packages

Linux Kernel
Unknown Unknown

03 / CONNECTIONS

Connected vulnerabilities

related OPENSUSE-SU-2025:20081-1
related SUSE-SU-2025:03600-1
related SUSE-SU-2025:03601-1
related SUSE-SU-2025:03602-1
related SUSE-SU-2025:03633-1
related SUSE-SU-2025:03634-1
related SUSE-SU-2025:20851-1
related SUSE-SU-2025:20861-1
related SUSE-SU-2025:20870-1
related SUSE-SU-2025:20898-1
related SUSE-SU-2025:21074-1
related SUSE-SU-2025:21139-1
related SUSE-SU-2025:21179-1
related SUSE-SU-2025:3725-1
related SUSE-SU-2025:3751-1

04 / EVIDENCE

Source records

Open Source Vulnerabilities CVE-2025-38679

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: venus: Fix OOB read due to missing payload bound check Currently, The event_seq_changed() handler processes a variable number of properties sent by the firmware. The number of properties is indicated by the firmware and used to iterate over the payload. However, the payload size is not being validated against the actual message length. This can lead to out-of-bounds memory access if the firmware provides a property count that exceeds the data available in the payload. Such a condition can result in kernel crashes or potential information leaks if memory beyond the buffer is accessed. Fix this by properly validating the remaining size of the payload before each property access and updating bounds accordingly as properties are parsed. This ensures that property parsing is safely bounded within the received message buffer and protects against malformed or malicious firmware behavior.

View original source

05 / REFERENCES

Further evidence