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CVE-2025-6224 Moderate

Leaks private key in certs in github.com/juju/utils

Leaks private key in certs in github.com/juju/utils

Exploit probability 0.1%
Published July 28, 2025
Required by Not available
Last source change March 3, 2026

02 / AFFECTED SOFTWARE

Affected packages

Unknown Unknown

3 explicit affected versions

Go github.com/juju/utils
Go github.com/juju/utils/v2
Go github.com/juju/utils/v3
Go github.com/juju/utils/v4
Go github.com/juju/utils/v4/cert

03 / CONNECTIONS

Connected vulnerabilities

04 / EVIDENCE

Source records

Open Source Vulnerabilities CVE-2025-6224

Certificate generation in juju/utils using the cert.NewLeaf function could include private information. If this certificate were then transferred over the network in plaintext, an attacker listening on that network could sniff the certificate and trivially extract the private key from it.

View original source
Open Source Vulnerabilities GHSA-h34r-jxqm-qgpr

### Summary Certs generated by v4 contain their private key. ## Details ### Background Recently, I encountered an API in Go that’s easy to misuse: sha512.Sum384 and sha512.New384().Sum look very similar and behave very differently. https://go.dev/play/p/kDCqqoYk84k demonstrates this. I want to discuss extending static analysis to detect this case with the go community, but before I do that, I want to make a best-effort pass at open-source projects to fix the existing bugs. I figured that if there were any vulnerabilities out there, they would be easy to find once that discussion begins, so it’s better to address them early. This work is a hobby project and has no affiliation with my employer, so I may be slow to respond due to existing commitments. ### PoC https://go.dev/play/p/vSW0U3Hq4qk ### Impact [This code](https://github.com/juju/utils/blob/0141ef0ee74a0cac603c5c9e4aff194008722f41/cert/cert.go#L120) (cert.NewLeaf) generates certs with the SubjectKeyId set to `sha512.New384().Sum(/* private */ key)`. If a cert which was generated by cert.NewLeaf is transferred over the network in plaintext, as is often the case in TLS handshakes, an attacker listening on that network may sniff the cert and trivially extract the private key from it. This applies to client and server TLS certs generated by vulnerable versions of this library. Getting the server cert and its key would only require performing a TLS handshake (with a matching SNI) with the server. At that point, the attacker could impersonate the server. Similarly, getting the client cert and its key would require getting the client to perform a TLS handshake against an attacker-controlled server. At that point, an attacker could impersonate the client.

View original source

05 / REFERENCES

Further evidence