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CVE-2026-22728 Moderate

Bitnami Sealed Secrets /v1/rotate can widen sealing scope to cluster-wide via attacker-controlled template annotations

Bitnami Sealed Secrets is vulnerable to a scope-widening attack during the secret rotation (/v1/rotate) flow. The rotation handler derives the sealing scope for the newly encrypted output from untrusted spec.template.metadata.annotations present in the input SealedSecret. By submitting a victim SealedSecret to the rotate endpoint with the annotation sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true injected into the template metadata, a remote attacker can obtain a rotated version of the secret that is cluster-wide. This bypasses original "strict" or "namespace-wide" constraints, allowing the attacker to retarget and unseal the secret in any namespace or under any name to recover the plaintext credentials.

Exploit probability 0.4%
Published February 26, 2026
Required by Not available
Last source change March 23, 2026

02 / AFFECTED SOFTWARE

Affected packages

Unknown Unknown

2 explicit affected versions

Go github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets
Go github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets
Bitnami sealed-secrets

03 / CONNECTIONS

Connected vulnerabilities

related OPENSUSE-SU-2026:21483-1

04 / EVIDENCE

Source records

Open Source Vulnerabilities CVE-2026-22728

Bitnami Sealed Secrets is vulnerable to a scope-widening attack during the secret rotation (/v1/rotate) flow. The rotation handler derives the sealing scope for the newly encrypted output from untrusted spec.template.metadata.annotations present in the input SealedSecret. By submitting a victim SealedSecret to the rotate endpoint with the annotation sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true injected into the template metadata, a remote attacker can obtain a rotated version of the secret that is cluster-wide. This bypasses original "strict" or "namespace-wide" constraints, allowing the attacker to retarget and unseal the secret in any namespace or under any name to recover the plaintext credentials.

View original source
Open Source Vulnerabilities GHSA-465p-v42x-3fmj

This report shows a scope-widening issue in the rotate (re-encrypt) flow: the output scope can be derived from untrusted `spec.template.metadata.annotations` on the input sealed secret. If a victim sealed secret is strict- or namespace-scoped, an attacker who can submit it to the rotate endpoint can set `sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true` in the template metadata and receive a rotated sealed secret that is cluster-wide, enabling retargeting (`metadata.name`/`metadata.namespace`) and unsealing to recover the victim plaintext. ## Relevant Links (Pinned) - Rotate handler uses `NewSealedSecret(..., secret)` after unsealing: https://github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets/blob/946bc048f3407117c837da6e4300686522d4c4eb/pkg/controller/controller.go#L560-L606 - Scope derivation reads secret annotations (`SecretScope`): https://github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets/blob/946bc048f3407117c837da6e4300686522d4c4eb/pkg/apis/sealedsecrets/v1alpha1/sealedsecret_expansion.go#L112-L122 ## Root Cause The rotate flow unseals the input sealed secret to a `Secret`, then reseals using `NewSealedSecret(..., secret)`. Because `SecretScope(secret)` is computed from secret annotations, and unsealing applies `spec.template` metadata onto the unsealed secret, an attacker can influence the scope of the rotated output by mutating template annotations on the rotate input. ## Attack Path 1. Attacker obtains a victim `SealedSecret` object (for example via read access to resources or logs) and can submit it to the controller rotate endpoint. 2. Attacker sets `spec.template.metadata.annotations.sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true` (and optionally retargets name/namespace fields). 3. Rotate returns a resealed, cluster-wide sealed secret that is no longer bound to the victim name/namespace. 4. Attacker unseals the rotated output in their chosen namespace/name to recover the victim plaintext. ## Proof of Concept Setup + run: ```bash unzip poc.zip -d poc cd poc make test ``` Canonical output (excerpt): ``` [CALLSITE_HIT]: pkg/apis/sealedsecrets/v1alpha1/sealedsecret_expansion.go:112 SecretScope [PROOF_MARKER]: scope_widened=true rotated_scope=cluster-wide ``` Control output (excerpt): ``` [NC_MARKER]: scope_widened=false strict_scope_preserved=true ``` ## Fix Accepted When Rotate preserves the original sealing scope and does not allow scope widening based on untrusted template metadata; strict or namespace-wide inputs cannot produce cluster-wide outputs. [poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25080027/poc.zip) [PR_DESCRIPTION.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25080028/PR_DESCRIPTION.md) [attack_scenario.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25080029/attack_scenario.md)

View original source
Open Source Vulnerabilities GO-2026-4565

Sealed Secrets for Kubernetes: Rotate API Allows Scope Widening from Strict/Namespace-Wide to Cluster-Wide via Untrusted Template Annotations in github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets

View original source
Open Source Vulnerabilities BIT-sealed-secrets-2026-22728

Bitnami Sealed Secrets is vulnerable to a scope-widening attack during the secret rotation (/v1/rotate) flow. The rotation handler derives the sealing scope for the newly encrypted output from untrusted spec.template.metadata.annotations present in the input SealedSecret. By submitting a victim SealedSecret to the rotate endpoint with the annotation sealedsecrets.bitnami.com/cluster-wide=true injected into the template metadata, a remote attacker can obtain a rotated version of the secret that is cluster-wide. This bypasses original "strict" or "namespace-wide" constraints, allowing the attacker to retarget and unseal the secret in any namespace or under any name to recover the plaintext credentials.

View original source

05 / REFERENCES

Further evidence