Fulcio vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via MetaIssuer Regex Bypass
Fulcio is a certificate authority for issuing code signing certificates for an OpenID Connect (OIDC) identity. Prior to 1.8.5, Fulcio's metaRegex() function uses unanchored regex, allowing attackers to bypass MetaIssuer URL validation and trigger SSRF to arbitrary internal services. Since the SSRF only can trigger GET requests, the request cannot mutate state. The response from the GET request is not returned to the caller so data exfiltration is not possible. A malicious actor could attempt to probe an internal network through Blind SSRF. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.8.5.
02 / AFFECTED SOFTWARE
Affected packages
43 explicit affected versions
03 / CONNECTIONS
Connected vulnerabilities
04 / EVIDENCE
Source records
Fulcio is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via MetaIssuer Regex Bypass in github.com/sigstore/fulcio
# Security Disclosure: SSRF via MetaIssuer Regex Bypass ## Summary Fulcio's `metaRegex()` function uses unanchored regex, allowing attackers to bypass MetaIssuer URL validation and trigger SSRF to arbitrary internal services. Since the SSRF only can trigger GET requests, the request cannot mutate state. The response from the GET request is not returned to the caller so data exfiltration is not possible. A malicious actor could attempt to probe an internal network through [Blind SSRF](https://portswigger.net/web-security/ssrf/blind). ## Impact - SSRF to cloud metadata (169.254.169.254) - SSRF to internal Kubernetes APIs - SSRF to any service accessible from Fulcio's network - Affects ALL deployments using MetaIssuers ## Patches Upgrade to v1.8.5. ## Workarounds None. If anchors are included in the meta issuer configuration URL, they will be escaped before the regular expression is compiled, not making this a sufficient mitigation. Deployments must upgrade to the latest Fulcio release v1.8.5. ## Affected Code **File**: `pkg/config/config.go` **Function**: `metaRegex()` (lines 143-156) ```go func metaRegex(issuer string) (*regexp.Regexp, error) { quoted := regexp.QuoteMeta(issuer) replaced := strings.ReplaceAll(quoted, regexp.QuoteMeta("*"), "[-_a-zA-Z0-9]+") return regexp.Compile(replaced) // Missing ^ and $ anchors } ``` ## The Bug The regex has no `^` (start) or `$` (end) anchors. Go's `regexp.MatchString()` does substring matching, so: ``` Pattern: https://oidc.eks.*.amazonaws.com/id/* Regex: https://oidc\.eks\.[-_a-zA-Z0-9]+\.amazonaws\.com/id/[-_a-zA-Z0-9]+ Input: https://attacker.com/x/https://oidc.eks.foo.amazonaws.com/id/bar Result: MATCHES (substring found) ``` ## Exploit 1. Attacker sends JWT with `iss` claim: `https://attacker.com/path/https://oidc.eks.x.amazonaws.com/id/y` 2. Fulcio's `GetIssuer()` matches this against MetaIssuer patterns 3. Unanchored regex matches the embedded pattern as substring 4. Fulcio calls `oidc.NewProvider()` with attacker's URL 5. HTTP request goes to `attacker.com`, not `amazonaws.com` 6. Attacker returns OIDC discovery with `jwks_uri` pointing to internal service 7. Fulcio fetches from internal service → SSRF
Fulcio is a certificate authority for issuing code signing certificates for an OpenID Connect (OIDC) identity. Prior to 1.8.5, Fulcio's metaRegex() function uses unanchored regex, allowing attackers to bypass MetaIssuer URL validation and trigger SSRF to arbitrary internal services. Since the SSRF only can trigger GET requests, the request cannot mutate state. The response from the GET request is not returned to the caller so data exfiltration is not possible. A malicious actor could attempt to probe an internal network through Blind SSRF. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.8.5.
05 / REFERENCES
Further evidence
- https://github.com/sigstore/fulcio/commit/eaae2f2be56df9dea5f9b439ec81bedae4c0978d
- https://github.com/sigstore/fulcio/security/advisories/GHSA-59jp-pj84-45mr
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22772
- https://github.com/sigstore/fulcio
- https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/22xxx/CVE-2026-22772.json