ZITADEL's truncated opaque tokens are still valid in github.com/zitadel/zitadel
ZITADEL's truncated opaque tokens are still valid in github.com/zitadel/zitadel. NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions. (If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.) The additional affected modules and versions are: github.com/zitadel/zitadel from v3.0.0 before v3.4.7; github.com/zitadel/zitadel from v4.0.0 before v4.11.0.
02 / AFFECTED SOFTWARE
Affected packages
219 explicit affected versions
03 / CONNECTIONS
Connected vulnerabilities
04 / EVIDENCE
Source records
ZITADEL is an open source identity management platform. Starting in version 2.31.0 and prior to versions 3.4.7 and 4.11.0, opaque OIDC access tokens in the v2 format truncated to 80 characters are still considered valid. Zitadel uses a symmetric AES encryption for opaque tokens. The cleartext payload is a concatenation of a couple of identifiers, such as a token ID and user ID. Internally Zitadel has 2 different versions of token payloads. v1 tokens are no longer created, but are still verified as to not invalidate existing session after upgrade. The cleartext payload has a format of `<token_id>:<user_id>`. v2 tokens distinguished further where the `token_id` is of the format `v2_<oidc_session_id>-at_<access_token_id>`. V1 token authZ/N session data is retrieved from the database using the (simple) `token_id` value and `user_id` value. The `user_id` (called `subject` in some parts of our code) was used as being the trusted user ID. V2 token authZ/N session data is retrieved from the database using the `oidc_session_id` and `access_token_id` and in this case the `user_id` from the token is ignored and taken from the session data in the database. By truncating the token to 80 chars, the user_id is now missing from the cleartext of the v2 token. The back-end still accepts this for above reasons. This issue is not considered exploitable, but may look awkward when reproduced. The patch in versions 4.11.0 and 3.4.7 resolves the issue by verifying the `user_id` from the token against the session data from the database. No known workarounds are available.
### Summary Opaque OIDC access tokens in v2 format, truncated to 80 characters are still considered valid. ZITADEL uses a symmetric AES encryption for opaque tokens. The cleartext payload is a concatenation of a couple of identifiers, such as a token ID and user ID. Internally Zitadel has 2 different versions of token payloads. v1 tokens are no longer created, but are still verified as to not invalidate existing session after upgrade. The cleartext payload has a format of `<token_id>:<user_id>`. v2 tokens distinguished further where the `token_id` is of the format `v2_<oidc_session_id>-at_<access_token_id>`. This is an example of such a cleartext: `V2_354201447279099906-at_354201447279165442:354201364702363650` ### Impact V1 token authZ/N session data is retrieved from the database using the (simple) `token_id` value and `user_id` value. The `user_id` (called `subject` in some parts of our code) was used as being the trusted user ID. V2 token authZ/N session data is retrieved from the database using the `oidc_session_id` and `access_token_id` and in this case the `user_id` from the token is ignored and taken from the session data in the database. By truncating the token to 80 chars, the user_id is now missing from the cleartext of the v2 token: `V2_354201447279099906-at_354201447279165442:` The back-end still accepts this for above reasons. This issue is not considered exploitable, but may look awkward when reproduced. ### Affected Versions All versions within the following ranges, including release candidates (RCs), are affected: - **v4.x**: `4.0.0` through `4.10.1` - **3.x**: `3.0.0` through `3.4.6` - **2.x**: `2.31.0` through `2.71.19` ### Patches The vulnerability has been addressed in the latest releases. The patch resolves the issue by verifying the `user_id` from the token against the session data from the database 4.x: Upgrade to >=[4.11.0](https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/releases/tag/v4.11.0) 3.x: Update to >=[3.4.7](https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/releases/tag/v3.4.7) 2.x: Update to >=[3.4.7](https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/releases/tag/v3.4.7) ### Workarounds The recommended solution is to update ZITADEL to a patched version. ### Questions If there any questions or comments about this advisory, please send an email to [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) ### Credits ZITADEL thanks Olivier Becker and Lucas Dodgson for reporting this vulnerability.
ZITADEL's truncated opaque tokens are still valid in github.com/zitadel/zitadel. NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions. (If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.) The additional affected modules and versions are: github.com/zitadel/zitadel from v3.0.0 before v3.4.7; github.com/zitadel/zitadel from v4.0.0 before v4.11.0.
05 / REFERENCES
Further evidence
- https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/27xxx/CVE-2026-27840.json
- https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/releases/tag/v3.4.7
- https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/releases/tag/v4.11.0
- https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/security/advisories/GHSA-6mq3-xmgp-pjm5
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27840
- https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel
- https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/commit/feab8e1fa371f3ad654640fc869b2c14f2fdb602
- https://github.com/zitadel/zitadel/releases/tag/v2.71.19