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CVE-2026-28492 High

FileBrowser has Path Traversal in Public Share Links that Exposes Files Outside Shared Directory in github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser

FileBrowser has Path Traversal in Public Share Links that Exposes Files Outside Shared Directory in github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser

Exploit probability 0.3%
Published March 10, 2026
Required by Not available
Last source change March 23, 2026

02 / AFFECTED SOFTWARE

Affected packages

Unknown Unknown

133 explicit affected versions

Go github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2
Go github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser
Go github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2

03 / CONNECTIONS

Connected vulnerabilities

related OPENSUSE-SU-2026:21483-1

04 / EVIDENCE

Source records

Open Source Vulnerabilities GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69

### Summary When a user creates a public share link for a **directory**, the `withHashFile` middleware in `http/public.go` (line 59) uses `filepath.Dir(link.Path)` to compute the `BasePathFs` root. This sets the filesystem root to the **parent directory** instead of the shared directory itself, allowing anyone with the share link to browse and download files from all sibling directories. ### Details In `http/public.go` lines 52-64, the `withHashFile` function handles public share link requests: ```go basePath := link.Path // e.g. "/documents/shared" filePath := "" if file.IsDir { basePath = filepath.Dir(basePath) // BUG: becomes "/documents" (parent!) filePath = ifPath } d.user.Fs = afero.NewBasePathFs(d.user.Fs, basePath) ``` When a directory at `/documents/shared` is shared, `filepath.Dir("/documents/shared")` evaluates to `"/documents"`. The `BasePathFs` is then rooted at the parent directory `/documents/`, giving the share link access to **everything** under `/documents/` - not just the intended `/documents/shared/`. This affects both `publicShareHandler` (directory listing via `/api/public/share/{hash}`) and `publicDlHandler` (file download via `/api/public/dl/{hash}/path`). ### PoC 1. Set up filebrowser with a user whose scope contains: 2. - `/documents/shared/public-file.txt` (intended to be shared) 3. - `/documents/secrets/passwords.txt` (NOT intended to be shared) 4. - `/documents/private/financial.csv` (NOT intended to be shared) 2. Create a public share link for the directory `/documents/shared` (via POST `/api/share/documents/shared`) 3. Access the share link: `GET /api/public/share/{hash}` 4. - **Expected**: Lists only contents of `/documents/shared/` 5. - **Actual**: Lists contents of `/documents/` (parent), revealing `secrets/`, `private/`, and `shared/` directories 4. Download sibling files: `GET /api/public/dl/{hash}/secrets/passwords.txt` 5. - **Expected**: 404 or 403 (file outside share scope) 6. - **Actual**: 200 with file contents (sibling file downloaded successfully) **Standalone Go test** reproducing the exact vulnerable code path with `afero.NewBasePathFs`: ```go func TestShareScopeEscape(t *testing.T) { baseFs := afero.NewMemMapFs() afero.WriteFile(baseFs, "/documents/shared/public.txt", []byte("public"), 0644) afero.WriteFile(baseFs, "/documents/secrets/passwords.txt", []byte("admin:hunter2"), 0644) linkPath := "/documents/shared" basePath := filepath.Dir(linkPath) // BUG: "/documents" scopedFs := afero.NewBasePathFs(baseFs, basePath) // Sibling file is accessible through the share: f, err := scopedFs.Open("/secrets/passwords.txt") // err is nil - file accessible! Content: "admin:hunter2" } ``` This test passes, confirming the vulnerability. ### Impact **Unauthenticated information disclosure (CWE-200, CWE-706)**. Anyone with a public share link for a directory can: - Browse all sibling directories and files of the shared directory - - Download any file within the parent directory scope - - This works without authentication (public shares) or after providing the share password (password-protected shares) All filebrowser v2.x installations that use directory sharing are affected. ### Recommended Fix Remove the `filepath.Dir()` call and use `link.Path` directly as the `BasePathFs` root: ```go if file.IsDir { // Don't change basePath - keep it as link.Path filePath = ifPath } d.user.Fs = afero.NewBasePathFs(d.user.Fs, basePath) ``` **Affected commit**: e3d00d591b567a8bfe3b02e42ba586859002c77d (latest) **File**: `http/public.go`, line 59

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Open Source Vulnerabilities GO-2026-4585

FileBrowser has Path Traversal in Public Share Links that Exposes Files Outside Shared Directory in github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser

View original source
Open Source Vulnerabilities CVE-2026-28492

File Browser provides a file managing interface within a specified directory and it can be used to upload, delete, preview, rename and edit files. Prior to version 2.61.0, when a user creates a public share link for a directory, the withHashFile middleware in http/public.go uses filepath.Dir(link.Path) to compute the BasePathFs root. This sets the filesystem root to the parent directory instead of the shared directory itself, allowing anyone with the share link to browse and download files from all sibling directories. This issue has been patched in version 2.61.0.

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05 / REFERENCES

Further evidence