New API: IDOR in VideoProxy allows cross-user video content access via missing ownership check in github.com/QuantumNous/new-api

Open Source Vulnerabilities GHSA-f35r-v9x5-r8mc

## Summary The video proxy endpoint `GET /v1/videos/:task_id/content` is vulnerable to an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR). Any authenticated user who knows another user's `task_id` can retrieve that user's generated video content because the handler queries tasks by `task_id` alone and does not verify ownership. ## Affected Component - Endpoint: `GET /v1/videos/:task_id/content` - Route middleware: `TokenOrUserAuth()` - Vulnerable handler: `controller.VideoProxy` ## Details `VideoProxy` fetches the task with: ```go task, exists, err := model.GetByOnlyTaskId(taskID) ``` `GetByOnlyTaskId` performs a database lookup using only `task_id`: ```go err = DB.Where("task_id = ?", taskId).First(&task).Error ``` The authenticated user's ID is available in request context, but `VideoProxy` does not use it. This allows any authenticated user to request `/v1/videos/<foreign_task_id>/content` and access another user's video if they know a valid task ID. Other task-fetch paths already enforce ownership correctly via: ```go model.GetByTaskId(userId, taskId) ``` ## Impact An authenticated attacker who knows another user's `task_id` can: - Download video content belonging to another user - Bypass tenant isolation for generated media assets - Cause the server to fetch upstream video content for a task the attacker does not own For Gemini tasks, the proxy also uses `task.PrivateData.Key` when contacting the upstream provider. In addition, full upstream response headers are forwarded back to the requester. ## Proof of Concept ```bash curl -o stolen_video.mp4 \ "https://<instance>/v1/videos/<victim_task_id>/content" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer sk-<attacker_token>" ``` Expected result: - Response returns `200 OK` - Response body contains the victim's video content ## Recommended Fix Replace the task lookup in `VideoProxy` with an ownership-checked query: ```go userId := c.GetInt("id") task, exists, err := model.GetByTaskId(userId, taskID) ```

Open Source Vulnerabilities GO-2026-4814

New API: IDOR in VideoProxy allows cross-user video content access via missing ownership check in github.com/QuantumNous/new-api

Open Source Vulnerabilities CVE-2026-30886

New API is a large language mode (LLM) gateway and artificial intelligence (AI) asset management system. Prior to version 0.11.4-alpha.2, an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in the video proxy endpoint (`GET /v1/videos/:task_id/content`) allows any authenticated user to access video content belonging to other users and causes the server to authenticate to upstream AI providers (Google Gemini, OpenAI) using credentials derived from tasks they do not own. The missing authorization check is a single function call — `model.GetByOnlyTaskId(taskID)` queries by `task_id` alone with no `user_id` filter, while every other task-lookup in the codebase enforces ownership via `model.GetByTaskId(userId, taskID)`. Version 0.11.4-alpha.2 contains a patch.