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CVE-2026-31685 Not scored

netfilter: ip6t_eui64: reject invalid MAC header for all packets

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ip6t_eui64: reject invalid MAC header for all packets `eui64_mt6()` derives a modified EUI-64 from the Ethernet source address and compares it with the low 64 bits of the IPv6 source address. The existing guard only rejects an invalid MAC header when `par->fragoff != 0`. For packets with `par->fragoff == 0`, `eui64_mt6()` can still reach `eth_hdr(skb)` even when the MAC header is not valid. Fix this by removing the `par->fragoff != 0` condition so that packets with an invalid MAC header are rejected before accessing `eth_hdr(skb)`.

Exploit probability 0.3%
Published April 25, 2026
Required by Not available
Last source change July 22, 2026

02 / AFFECTED SOFTWARE

Affected packages

Unknown Unknown

1798 explicit affected versions

Linux Kernel

03 / CONNECTIONS

Connected vulnerabilities

related ALSA-2026:21706
related ALSA-2026:21745
related CGA-MQ24-C8P9-RXGX
related OPENSUSE-SU-2026:20826-1
related SUSE-SU-2026:2068-1
related SUSE-SU-2026:2111-1
related SUSE-SU-2026:21841-1
related SUSE-SU-2026:21845-1
related SUSE-SU-2026:21860-1
related SUSE-SU-2026:2202-1
related SUSE-SU-2026:2215-1
related SUSE-SU-2026:2216-1
related SUSE-SU-2026:2217-1

04 / EVIDENCE

Source records

Open Source Vulnerabilities CVE-2026-31685

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ip6t_eui64: reject invalid MAC header for all packets `eui64_mt6()` derives a modified EUI-64 from the Ethernet source address and compares it with the low 64 bits of the IPv6 source address. The existing guard only rejects an invalid MAC header when `par->fragoff != 0`. For packets with `par->fragoff == 0`, `eui64_mt6()` can still reach `eth_hdr(skb)` even when the MAC header is not valid. Fix this by removing the `par->fragoff != 0` condition so that packets with an invalid MAC header are rejected before accessing `eth_hdr(skb)`.

View original source

05 / REFERENCES

Further evidence