Chall-Manager's invalid NetworkPolicy enables a malicious actor to pivot into another namespace
### Impact Due to a mis-written NetworkPolicy, a malicious actor can pivot from an instance to any Pod out of the origin namespace. This breaks the security-by-default property expected as part of the deployment program, leading to a potential lateral movement. In the specific case of `sdk/kubernetes.Kompose` it does not isolate the instances. ### Patch Removing the `inter-ns` NetworkPolicy patches the vulnerability. If updates are not possible in production environments, we recommend to manually delete it and update as soon as possible. ### Workaround Given your context, delete the failing network policy that should be prefixed by `inter-ns-` in the target namespace. You can use the following to delete all matching network policy. If unsure of the outcome, please do it manually. ```bash for ns in $(kubectl get ns -o jsonpath='{.items[*].metadata.name}' | tr ' ' '\n' | grep '^cm-target-'); do kubectl -n "$ns" get networkpolicy -o name \ | grep '^networkpolicy.networking.k8s.io/inter-ns-' \ | xargs -r kubectl -n "$ns" delete done ```
02 / AFFECTED SOFTWARE
Affected packages
62 explicit affected versions
03 / CONNECTIONS
Connected vulnerabilities
04 / EVIDENCE
Source records
### Impact Due to a mis-written NetworkPolicy, a malicious actor can pivot from an instance to any Pod out of the origin namespace. This breaks the security-by-default property expected as part of the deployment program, leading to a potential lateral movement. In the specific case of `sdk/kubernetes.Kompose` it does not isolate the instances. ### Patch Removing the `inter-ns` NetworkPolicy patches the vulnerability. If updates are not possible in production environments, we recommend to manually delete it and update as soon as possible. ### Workaround Given your context, delete the failing network policy that should be prefixed by `inter-ns-` in the target namespace. You can use the following to delete all matching network policy. If unsure of the outcome, please do it manually. ```bash for ns in $(kubectl get ns -o jsonpath='{.items[*].metadata.name}' | tr ' ' '\n' | grep '^cm-target-'); do kubectl -n "$ns" get networkpolicy -o name \ | grep '^networkpolicy.networking.k8s.io/inter-ns-' \ | xargs -r kubectl -n "$ns" delete done ```
Chall-Manager's invalid NetworkPolicy enables a malicious actor to pivot into another namespace in github.com/ctfer-io/chall-manager/deploy
Chall-Manager is a platform-agnostic system able to start Challenges on Demand of a player. In versions prior to 0.6.5, due to a miswritten NetworkPolicy, a malicious actor can pivot from an instance to any Pod out of the origin namespace. This breaks the security-by-default property expected as part of the deployment program, leading to a potential lateral movement. In the specific case of sdk/kubernetes.Kompose it does not isolate the instances. This issue has been fixed in version 0.6.5.
05 / REFERENCES
Further evidence
- https://github.com/ctfer-io/chall-manager
- https://github.com/ctfer-io/chall-manager/commit/dc5ef27dfed2befef7f506ab8ca14d062b0d79c5
- https://github.com/ctfer-io/chall-manager/releases/tag/v0.6.5
- https://github.com/ctfer-io/chall-manager/security/advisories/GHSA-mw24-f3xh-j3qv
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32768
- https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/32xxx/CVE-2026-32768.json