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CVE-2026-50274 High

dd-trace-go: Improper parsing of W3C baggage headers may lead to DoS

### Impact Datadog tracing libraries that implement W3C baggage propagation parse incoming baggage HTTP headers without enforcing item-count or byte-size limits on the extract path. The DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_ITEMS (default 64) and DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_BYTES (default 8192) limits were applied only to baggage injection, not extraction. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a request whose baggage header contains an arbitrarily large number of comma-separated key-value pairs (or a single very large value). The tracer allocates a hash-map entry for each pair on every request, causing unbounded CPU and memory consumption and enabling a remote Denial of Service against any HTTP service that has the baggage propagation style enabled. The baggage propagation style is enabled by default in most affected tracers, so any internet-facing service that has been instrumented with an affected tracer version is exposed unless the propagation style has been explicitly narrowed. ### Patches This is resolved in version 2.8.1 and later of the `dd-trace-go` library. ### Workarounds If users cannot upgrade immediately: 1. Disable `baggage` extraction by removing `baggage` from `DD_TRACE_PROPAGATION_STYLE` (or `DD_TRACE_PROPAGATION_STYLE_EXTRACT` if set independently). 2. Cap the maximum HTTP request header size at an upstream proxy or web server (for example, Apache `LimitRequestFieldSize`, Nginx `large_client_header_buffers`, Envoy `max_request_headers_kb`). ### Resources Related upstream advisories: [opentelemetry-go GHSA-mh2q-q3fh-2475](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/security/advisories/GHSA-mh2q-q3fh-2475) [opentelemetry-dotnet GHSA-g94r-2vxg-569j](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet/security/advisories/GHSA-g94r-2vxg-569j)

Exploit probability 0.4%
Published July 15, 2026
Required by Not available
Last source change July 29, 2026

02 / AFFECTED SOFTWARE

Affected packages

Go github.com/DataDog/dd-trace-go
Go github.com/DataDog/dd-trace-go/v2
Unknown Unknown

622 explicit affected versions

Go github.com/DataDog/dd-trace-go
Go github.com/DataDog/dd-trace-go/v2

03 / CONNECTIONS

Connected vulnerabilities

04 / EVIDENCE

Source records

Open Source Vulnerabilities CVE-2026-50274

Datadog dd-trace-go is a Go client library for Datadog application performance monitoring, profiling, and security monitoring. Prior to 2.8.1, Datadog tracing libraries that implement W3C baggage propagation parse incoming baggage HTTP headers without enforcing DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_ITEMS or DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_BYTES limits on the extract path. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a request whose baggage header contains an arbitrarily large number of comma-separated key-value pairs or a single very large value, causing unbounded CPU and memory consumption and enabling a remote denial of service against HTTP services with baggage propagation enabled. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.1.

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Open Source Vulnerabilities GO-2026-6000

Improper parsing of W3C baggage headers may lead to DoS in github.com/DataDog/dd-trace-go

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Open Source Vulnerabilities GHSA-74j5-xf3v-crq8

### Impact Datadog tracing libraries that implement W3C baggage propagation parse incoming baggage HTTP headers without enforcing item-count or byte-size limits on the extract path. The DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_ITEMS (default 64) and DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_BYTES (default 8192) limits were applied only to baggage injection, not extraction. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a request whose baggage header contains an arbitrarily large number of comma-separated key-value pairs (or a single very large value). The tracer allocates a hash-map entry for each pair on every request, causing unbounded CPU and memory consumption and enabling a remote Denial of Service against any HTTP service that has the baggage propagation style enabled. The baggage propagation style is enabled by default in most affected tracers, so any internet-facing service that has been instrumented with an affected tracer version is exposed unless the propagation style has been explicitly narrowed. ### Patches This is resolved in version 2.8.1 and later of the `dd-trace-go` library. ### Workarounds If users cannot upgrade immediately: 1. Disable `baggage` extraction by removing `baggage` from `DD_TRACE_PROPAGATION_STYLE` (or `DD_TRACE_PROPAGATION_STYLE_EXTRACT` if set independently). 2. Cap the maximum HTTP request header size at an upstream proxy or web server (for example, Apache `LimitRequestFieldSize`, Nginx `large_client_header_buffers`, Envoy `max_request_headers_kb`). ### Resources Related upstream advisories: [opentelemetry-go GHSA-mh2q-q3fh-2475](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/security/advisories/GHSA-mh2q-q3fh-2475) [opentelemetry-dotnet GHSA-g94r-2vxg-569j](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet/security/advisories/GHSA-g94r-2vxg-569j)

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05 / REFERENCES

Further evidence