Input: touchwin - reset the packet index on every complete packet
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: touchwin - reset the packet index on every complete packet tw_interrupt() accumulates each non-zero serial byte into a fixed three-byte buffer with a running index that is only reset once a full packet has been received *and* the device's two Y bytes agree: tw->data[tw->idx++] = data; if (tw->idx == TW_LENGTH && tw->data[1] == tw->data[2]) { ... tw->idx = 0; } The reset is gated on tw->data[1] == tw->data[2], a value the device controls. A malicious, malfunctioning or counterfeit Touchwindow peripheral can stream non-zero bytes whose 2nd and 3rd bytes differ: the index reaches TW_LENGTH without the equality holding, is never reset, and keeps growing, so tw->data[tw->idx++] walks off the end of the three-byte array and the rest of the heap-allocated struct tw, one attacker-chosen byte at a time -- an unbounded, device-driven heap out-of-bounds write. Reset the index on every completed packet and report an event only when the two Y bytes match, like the other serio touchscreen drivers do.
02 / AFFECTED SOFTWARE
Affected packages
03 / CONNECTIONS
Connected vulnerabilities
04 / EVIDENCE
Source records
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: touchwin - reset the packet index on every complete packet tw_interrupt() accumulates each non-zero serial byte into a fixed three-byte buffer with a running index that is only reset once a full packet has been received *and* the device's two Y bytes agree: tw->data[tw->idx++] = data; if (tw->idx == TW_LENGTH && tw->data[1] == tw->data[2]) { ... tw->idx = 0; } The reset is gated on tw->data[1] == tw->data[2], a value the device controls. A malicious, malfunctioning or counterfeit Touchwindow peripheral can stream non-zero bytes whose 2nd and 3rd bytes differ: the index reaches TW_LENGTH without the equality holding, is never reset, and keeps growing, so tw->data[tw->idx++] walks off the end of the three-byte array and the rest of the heap-allocated struct tw, one attacker-chosen byte at a time -- an unbounded, device-driven heap out-of-bounds write. Reset the index on every completed packet and report an event only when the two Y bytes match, like the other serio touchscreen drivers do.
05 / REFERENCES
Further evidence
- https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/044167cba2384bcd783547ad5e30ecd292b30919
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3e6f007b43e2fc6546e21fa74ee62c38984a6672
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/431ad239f2924dff337c3fccb9246597c1b63185
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/478cdd736f2ce3114f90e775d7358136d3977b94
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c9f29f128dd4057404838259af4c645318487e1
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/70e4248793762df9832fd4fc2fc6ac7924572c36
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8d87184576c889759e3aab899799a482f1e1a5b
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed9b66905407eb3d02df1aaeed82eb7a7f0eb508
- https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/64xxx/CVE-2026-64271.json
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64271