UBUNTU-CVE-2023-52608
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware: arm_scmi: Check mailbox/SMT channel for consistency On reception of a completion interrupt the shared memory area is accessed to retrieve the message header at first and then, if the message sequence number identifies a transaction which is still pending, the related payload is fetched too. When an SCMI command times out the channel ownership remains with the platform until eventually a late reply is received and, as a consequence, any further transmission attempt remains pending, waiting for the channel to be relinquished by the platform. Once that late reply is received the channel ownership is given back to the agent and any pending request is then allowed to proceed and overwrite the SMT area of the just delivered late reply; then the wait for the reply to the new request starts. It has been observed that the spurious IRQ related to the late reply can be wrongly associated with the freshly enqueued request: when that happens the SCMI stack in-flight lookup procedure is fooled by the fact that the message header now present in the SMT area is related to the new pending transaction, even though the real reply has still to arrive. This race-condition on the A2P channel can be detected by looking at the channel status bits: a genuine reply from the platform will have set the channel free bit before triggering the completion IRQ. Add a consistency check to validate such condition in the A2P ISR.
02 / AFFECTED SOFTWARE
Affected packages
7 explicit affected versions
29 explicit affected versions
30 explicit affected versions
41 explicit affected versions
50 explicit affected versions
6 explicit affected versions
12 explicit affected versions
16 explicit affected versions
6 explicit affected versions
13 explicit affected versions
4 explicit affected versions
23 explicit affected versions
21 explicit affected versions
50 explicit affected versions
36 explicit affected versions
47 explicit affected versions
36 explicit affected versions
7 explicit affected versions
43 explicit affected versions
7 explicit affected versions
44 explicit affected versions
9 explicit affected versions
35 explicit affected versions
3 explicit affected versions
14 explicit affected versions
18 explicit affected versions
5 explicit affected versions
9 explicit affected versions
16 explicit affected versions
10 explicit affected versions
7 explicit affected versions
12 explicit affected versions
34 explicit affected versions
12 explicit affected versions
10 explicit affected versions
7 explicit affected versions
12 explicit affected versions
12 explicit affected versions
10 explicit affected versions
37 explicit affected versions
9 explicit affected versions
10 explicit affected versions
23 explicit affected versions
26 explicit affected versions
13 explicit affected versions
4 explicit affected versions
29 explicit affected versions
13 explicit affected versions
47 explicit affected versions
45 explicit affected versions
7 explicit affected versions
33 explicit affected versions
23 explicit affected versions
10 explicit affected versions
11 explicit affected versions
12 explicit affected versions
7 explicit affected versions
12 explicit affected versions
36 explicit affected versions
28 explicit affected versions
44 explicit affected versions
10 explicit affected versions
26 explicit affected versions
1 explicit affected versions
13 explicit affected versions
16 explicit affected versions
47 explicit affected versions
37 explicit affected versions
3 explicit affected versions
2 explicit affected versions
51 explicit affected versions
1 explicit affected versions
12 explicit affected versions
34 explicit affected versions
27 explicit affected versions
20 explicit affected versions
8 explicit affected versions
8 explicit affected versions
5 explicit affected versions
8 explicit affected versions
10 explicit affected versions
9 explicit affected versions
13 explicit affected versions
7 explicit affected versions
39 explicit affected versions
10 explicit affected versions
12 explicit affected versions
12 explicit affected versions
44 explicit affected versions
16 explicit affected versions
3 explicit affected versions
13 explicit affected versions
26 explicit affected versions
33 explicit affected versions
37 explicit affected versions
14 explicit affected versions
38 explicit affected versions
37 explicit affected versions
9 explicit affected versions
36 explicit affected versions
11 explicit affected versions
44 explicit affected versions
8 explicit affected versions
7 explicit affected versions
18 explicit affected versions
4 explicit affected versions
1 explicit affected versions
1 explicit affected versions
42 explicit affected versions
10 explicit affected versions
43 explicit affected versions
10 explicit affected versions
8 explicit affected versions
14 explicit affected versions
4 explicit affected versions
7 explicit affected versions
1 explicit affected versions
03 / CONNECTIONS
Connected vulnerabilities
04 / EVIDENCE
Source records
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware: arm_scmi: Check mailbox/SMT channel for consistency On reception of a completion interrupt the shared memory area is accessed to retrieve the message header at first and then, if the message sequence number identifies a transaction which is still pending, the related payload is fetched too. When an SCMI command times out the channel ownership remains with the platform until eventually a late reply is received and, as a consequence, any further transmission attempt remains pending, waiting for the channel to be relinquished by the platform. Once that late reply is received the channel ownership is given back to the agent and any pending request is then allowed to proceed and overwrite the SMT area of the just delivered late reply; then the wait for the reply to the new request starts. It has been observed that the spurious IRQ related to the late reply can be wrongly associated with the freshly enqueued request: when that happens the SCMI stack in-flight lookup procedure is fooled by the fact that the message header now present in the SMT area is related to the new pending transaction, even though the real reply has still to arrive. This race-condition on the A2P channel can be detected by looking at the channel status bits: a genuine reply from the platform will have set the channel free bit before triggering the completion IRQ. Add a consistency check to validate such condition in the A2P ISR.
05 / REFERENCES
Further evidence
- https://git.kernel.org/linus/437a310b22244d4e0b78665c3042e5d1c0f45306
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/12dc4217f16551d6dee9cbefc23fdb5659558cda
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/437a310b22244d4e0b78665c3042e5d1c0f45306
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/614cc65032dcb0b64d23f5c5e338a8a04b12be5d
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f95f6997f4fdd17abec3200cae45420a5489350
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b5e1b93c83ee5fc9f5d7bd2d45b421bd87774a2
- https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2023-52608
- https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-6766-1
- https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-6766-2
- https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-6766-3
- https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-6795-1
- https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-6818-1
- https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-6818-2
- https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-6818-3
- https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-6818-4
- https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-6819-1
- https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-6819-2
- https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-6819-3
- https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-6819-4
- https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-6828-1
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52608