UBUNTU-CVE-2024-53111
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/mremap: fix address wraparound in move_page_tables() On 32-bit platforms, it is possible for the expression `len + old_addr < old_end` to be false-positive if `len + old_addr` wraps around. `old_addr` is the cursor in the old range up to which page table entries have been moved; so if the operation succeeded, `old_addr` is the *end* of the old region, and adding `len` to it can wrap. The overflow causes mremap() to mistakenly believe that PTEs have been copied; the consequence is that mremap() bails out, but doesn't move the PTEs back before the new VMA is unmapped, causing anonymous pages in the region to be lost. So basically if userspace tries to mremap() a private-anon region and hits this bug, mremap() will return an error and the private-anon region's contents appear to have been zeroed. The idea of this check is that `old_end - len` is the original start address, and writing the check that way also makes it easier to read; so fix the check by rearranging the comparison accordingly. (An alternate fix would be to refactor this function by introducing an "orig_old_start" variable or such.) Tested in a VM with a 32-bit X86 kernel; without the patch: ``` user@horn:~/big_mremap$ cat test.c #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <err.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #define ADDR1 ((void*)0x60000000) #define ADDR2 ((void*)0x10000000) #define SIZE 0x50000000uL int main(void) { unsigned char *p1 = mmap(ADDR1, SIZE, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE, -1, 0); if (p1 == MAP_FAILED) err(1, "mmap 1"); unsigned char *p2 = mmap(ADDR2, SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE, -1, 0); if (p2 == MAP_FAILED) err(1, "mmap 2"); *p1 = 0x41; printf("first char is 0x%02hhx\n", *p1); unsigned char *p3 = mremap(p1, SIZE, SIZE, MREMAP_MAYMOVE|MREMAP_FIXED, p2); if (p3 == MAP_FAILED) { printf("mremap() failed; first char is 0x%02hhx\n", *p1); } else { printf("mremap() succeeded; first char is 0x%02hhx\n", *p3); } } user@horn:~/big_mremap$ gcc -static -o test test.c user@horn:~/big_mremap$ setarch -R ./test first char is 0x41 mremap() failed; first char is 0x00 ``` With the patch: ``` user@horn:~/big_mremap$ setarch -R ./test first char is 0x41 mremap() succeeded; first char is 0x41 ```
02 / AFFECTED SOFTWARE
Affected packages
11 explicit affected versions
50 explicit affected versions
6 explicit affected versions
12 explicit affected versions
19 explicit affected versions
6 explicit affected versions
21 explicit affected versions
10 explicit affected versions
12 explicit affected versions
19 explicit affected versions
7 explicit affected versions
16 explicit affected versions
13 explicit affected versions
18 explicit affected versions
35 explicit affected versions
18 explicit affected versions
21 explicit affected versions
13 explicit affected versions
4 explicit affected versions
23 explicit affected versions
26 explicit affected versions
1 explicit affected versions
21 explicit affected versions
16 explicit affected versions
10 explicit affected versions
22 explicit affected versions
7 explicit affected versions
12 explicit affected versions
1 explicit affected versions
12 explicit affected versions
14 explicit affected versions
1 explicit affected versions
7 explicit affected versions
2 explicit affected versions
12 explicit affected versions
12 explicit affected versions
16 explicit affected versions
13 explicit affected versions
8 explicit affected versions
37 explicit affected versions
1 explicit affected versions
13 explicit affected versions
14 explicit affected versions
10 explicit affected versions
26 explicit affected versions
13 explicit affected versions
29 explicit affected versions
13 explicit affected versions
15 explicit affected versions
16 explicit affected versions
33 explicit affected versions
23 explicit affected versions
10 explicit affected versions
1 explicit affected versions
12 explicit affected versions
7 explicit affected versions
12 explicit affected versions
10 explicit affected versions
26 explicit affected versions
20 explicit affected versions
11 explicit affected versions
23 explicit affected versions
13 explicit affected versions
21 explicit affected versions
16 explicit affected versions
24 explicit affected versions
3 explicit affected versions
1 explicit affected versions
51 explicit affected versions
7 explicit affected versions
20 explicit affected versions
12 explicit affected versions
27 explicit affected versions
17 explicit affected versions
8 explicit affected versions
5 explicit affected versions
8 explicit affected versions
10 explicit affected versions
20 explicit affected versions
13 explicit affected versions
13 explicit affected versions
7 explicit affected versions
2 explicit affected versions
10 explicit affected versions
12 explicit affected versions
44 explicit affected versions
16 explicit affected versions
3 explicit affected versions
13 explicit affected versions
26 explicit affected versions
45 explicit affected versions
37 explicit affected versions
25 explicit affected versions
14 explicit affected versions
38 explicit affected versions
9 explicit affected versions
11 explicit affected versions
15 explicit affected versions
7 explicit affected versions
7 explicit affected versions
4 explicit affected versions
1 explicit affected versions
13 explicit affected versions
43 explicit affected versions
10 explicit affected versions
8 explicit affected versions
19 explicit affected versions
14 explicit affected versions
4 explicit affected versions
78 explicit affected versions
11 explicit affected versions
1 explicit affected versions
14 explicit affected versions
03 / CONNECTIONS
Connected vulnerabilities
04 / EVIDENCE
Source records
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/mremap: fix address wraparound in move_page_tables() On 32-bit platforms, it is possible for the expression `len + old_addr < old_end` to be false-positive if `len + old_addr` wraps around. `old_addr` is the cursor in the old range up to which page table entries have been moved; so if the operation succeeded, `old_addr` is the *end* of the old region, and adding `len` to it can wrap. The overflow causes mremap() to mistakenly believe that PTEs have been copied; the consequence is that mremap() bails out, but doesn't move the PTEs back before the new VMA is unmapped, causing anonymous pages in the region to be lost. So basically if userspace tries to mremap() a private-anon region and hits this bug, mremap() will return an error and the private-anon region's contents appear to have been zeroed. The idea of this check is that `old_end - len` is the original start address, and writing the check that way also makes it easier to read; so fix the check by rearranging the comparison accordingly. (An alternate fix would be to refactor this function by introducing an "orig_old_start" variable or such.) Tested in a VM with a 32-bit X86 kernel; without the patch: ``` user@horn:~/big_mremap$ cat test.c #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <err.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #define ADDR1 ((void*)0x60000000) #define ADDR2 ((void*)0x10000000) #define SIZE 0x50000000uL int main(void) { unsigned char *p1 = mmap(ADDR1, SIZE, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE, -1, 0); if (p1 == MAP_FAILED) err(1, "mmap 1"); unsigned char *p2 = mmap(ADDR2, SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE, -1, 0); if (p2 == MAP_FAILED) err(1, "mmap 2"); *p1 = 0x41; printf("first char is 0x%02hhx\n", *p1); unsigned char *p3 = mremap(p1, SIZE, SIZE, MREMAP_MAYMOVE|MREMAP_FIXED, p2); if (p3 == MAP_FAILED) { printf("mremap() failed; first char is 0x%02hhx\n", *p1); } else { printf("mremap() succeeded; first char is 0x%02hhx\n", *p3); } } user@horn:~/big_mremap$ gcc -static -o test test.c user@horn:~/big_mremap$ setarch -R ./test first char is 0x41 mremap() failed; first char is 0x00 ``` With the patch: ``` user@horn:~/big_mremap$ setarch -R ./test first char is 0x41 mremap() succeeded; first char is 0x41 ```
05 / REFERENCES
Further evidence
- https://git.kernel.org/linus/a4a282daf1a190f03790bf163458ea3c8d28d217
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/909543dc279a91122fb08e4653a72b82f0ad28f4
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a4a282daf1a190f03790bf163458ea3c8d28d217
- https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2024-53111
- https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-7276-1
- https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-7277-1
- https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-7310-1
- https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-7449-1
- https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-7449-2
- https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-7450-1
- https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-7451-1
- https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-7452-1
- https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-7453-1
- https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-7468-1
- https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-7523-1
- https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-7524-1
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-53111