Undici's cookie header not cleared on cross-origin redirect in fetch

Open Source Vulnerabilities GHSA-wqq4-5wpv-mx2g

### Impact Undici clears Authorization headers on cross-origin redirects, but does not clear `Cookie` headers. By design, `cookie` headers are [forbidden request headers](https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/#forbidden-request-header), disallowing them to be set in `RequestInit.headers` in browser environments. Since Undici handles headers more liberally than the specification, there was a disconnect from the assumptions the spec made, and Undici's implementation of fetch. As such this may lead to accidental leakage of cookie to a 3rd-party site or a malicious attacker who can control the redirection target (ie. an open redirector) to leak the cookie to the 3rd party site. ### Patches This was patched in [e041de359221ebeae04c469e8aff4145764e6d76](https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/e041de359221ebeae04c469e8aff4145764e6d76), which is included in version 5.26.2.

Open Source Vulnerabilities CVE-2023-45143

Undici is an HTTP/1.1 client written from scratch for Node.js. Prior to version 5.26.2, Undici already cleared Authorization headers on cross-origin redirects, but did not clear `Cookie` headers. By design, `cookie` headers are forbidden request headers, disallowing them to be set in RequestInit.headers in browser environments. Since undici handles headers more liberally than the spec, there was a disconnect from the assumptions the spec made, and undici's implementation of fetch. As such this may lead to accidental leakage of cookie to a third-party site or a malicious attacker who can control the redirection target (ie. an open redirector) to leak the cookie to the third party site. This was patched in version 5.26.2. There are no known workarounds.