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CVE-2025-46721 Moderate

nosurf vulnerable to CSRF due to non-functional same-origin request checks

nosurf is cross-site request forgery (CSRF) protection middleware for Go. A vulnerability in versions prior to 1.2.0 allows an attacker who controls content on the target site, or on a subdomain of the target site (either via XSS, or otherwise) to bypass CSRF checks and issue requests on user's behalf. Due to misuse of the Go `net/http` library, nosurf categorizes all incoming requests as plain-text HTTP requests, in which case the `Referer` header is not checked to have the same origin as the target webpage. If the attacker has control over HTML contents on either the target website (e.g. `example.com`), or on a website hosted on a subdomain of the target (e.g. `attacker.example.com`), they will also be able to manipulate cookies set for the target website. By acquiring the secret CSRF token from the cookie, or overriding the cookie with a new token known to the attacker, `attacker.example.com` is able to craft cross-site requests to `example.com`. A patch for the issue was released in nosurf 1.2.0. In lieu of upgrading to a patched version of nosurf, users may additionally use another HTTP middleware to ensure that a non-safe HTTP request is coming from the same origin (e.g. by requiring a `Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin` header in the request).

Exploit probability 0.2%
Published May 13, 2025
Required by Not available
Last source change August 12, 2026

02 / AFFECTED SOFTWARE

Affected packages

Unknown Unknown

3 explicit affected versions

Go github.com/justinas/nosurf
Go github.com/justinas/nosurf

03 / CONNECTIONS

Connected vulnerabilities

04 / EVIDENCE

Source records

Open Source Vulnerabilities GHSA-w9hf-35q4-vcjw

### Impact This vulnerability allows an attacker who controls content on the target site, or on a subdomain of the target site (either via XSS, or otherwise) to bypass Cross-Site Request Forgery checks and issue requests on user's behalf. ### Details Due to misuse of the Go `net/http` library, nosurf categorizes all incoming requests as plain-text HTTP requests, in which case the `Referer` header is not checked to have the same origin as the target webpage. If the attacker has control over HTML contents on either the target website (e.g. `example.com`), or on a website hosted on a subdomain of the target (e.g. `attacker.example.com`), they will also be able to manipulate cookies set for the target website. By acquiring the secret CSRF token from the cookie, or overriding the cookie with a new token known to the attacker, `attacker.example.com` is able to craft cross-site requests to `example.com`. ### Patches A patch for the issue was released in nosurf 1.2.0. ### Workarounds In lieu of upgrading to a patched version of nosurf, users may additionally use another HTTP middleware to ensure that a non-safe HTTP request is coming from the same origin (e.g. by requiring a `Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin` header in the request). ### References https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rq77-p4h8-4crw https://github.com/justinas/nosurf-cve-2025-46721 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-46721 https://github.com/justinas/nosurf/releases/tag/v1.2.0

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Open Source Vulnerabilities GO-2025-3683

Vulnerable to CSRF due to non-functional same-origin request checks in github.com/justinas/nosurf

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Open Source Vulnerabilities CVE-2025-46721

nosurf is cross-site request forgery (CSRF) protection middleware for Go. A vulnerability in versions prior to 1.2.0 allows an attacker who controls content on the target site, or on a subdomain of the target site (either via XSS, or otherwise) to bypass CSRF checks and issue requests on user's behalf. Due to misuse of the Go `net/http` library, nosurf categorizes all incoming requests as plain-text HTTP requests, in which case the `Referer` header is not checked to have the same origin as the target webpage. If the attacker has control over HTML contents on either the target website (e.g. `example.com`), or on a website hosted on a subdomain of the target (e.g. `attacker.example.com`), they will also be able to manipulate cookies set for the target website. By acquiring the secret CSRF token from the cookie, or overriding the cookie with a new token known to the attacker, `attacker.example.com` is able to craft cross-site requests to `example.com`. A patch for the issue was released in nosurf 1.2.0. In lieu of upgrading to a patched version of nosurf, users may additionally use another HTTP middleware to ensure that a non-safe HTTP request is coming from the same origin (e.g. by requiring a `Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin` header in the request).

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05 / REFERENCES

Further evidence